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Changing the Rules 
The life sciences are changing in their fundamental character, and 
at a rapid rate. These changes are of two principal kinds. First, 
tremendous technical advances have been realized over the past couple 
of decades. It is now possible and, indeed, is common practice to 
transfer genetic material between completely dissimilar organisms: from 
fish to plants, from microorganisms to animals, from humans to other 
organisms, and, theoretically, from other organisms to humans. It is 
also possible to isolate and to multiply for commercial use parts of 
organisms to, for example, mass-produce chemicals that are otherwise 
produced in much smaller quantities by plants. For instance, vanilla, an 
expensive flavouring that comes from the bean of the vanilla orchid, 
can now also be produced in a vat from masses of vanilla orchid cells. 
These technical advances have served to blur the distinctions between 
natural and man-made, between life and chemistry, and between living 
and nonliving. 
The second change, intimately connected with these scientific 
breakthroughs (to the extent that it is difficult to separate cause and 
effect) is a strong and escalating trend toward the commercialization of 
the life sciences. There are large profits to be made. Spurred on by 
advances in the science, investment capital has been mobilized in a way 
unprecedented in the history of biological science. 
The hype surrounding the new "biotechnologies," much of it 
generated in the interests of stimulating investment, has led to strong 
political support. An obvious prerequisite for investment is some 
assurance that the investment will be rewarded. In biotechnology, the 
investment is in research and development, and the assurance needed 
is some form of intellectual property protection. 
Mechanisms to protect new varieties of plants have been available 
in some countries for many years. In 1980, however, the U.S. took a 
new tack, using utility patents, formerly reserved for inanimate 
inventions, for microorganisms. Other industrialized countries soon 
followed suit. Canada has granted patents on microorganisms since 
1982, and has even granted patents on human cell lines. Then, in 
1987 the U.S. Patent Office announced that it would allow the 
industrial patenting of higher life forms, including pets and livestock. In 
1988, a patent was actually granted for a genetically engineered mouse 
that contains human genes and has value because it is especially 
susceptible to cancer (and so is useful for research). 
Although the argument for intellectual property protection is often 
couched in terms of increasing incentive to research, in many ways the 
motivations and the pressures are much more commercial and trade 
oriented; patents are being used to protect investment. This is reflected 
in the very strong pressures being exerted, by the U.S. and others, in 
bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations for international 
"harmonization" of intellectual property protection. Patent protection 
on living organisms is definitely included. 
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Patenting Life Forms 
Patent protection on living organisms raises a number of 
immediate and disturbing questions. Quite simply, the patent system 
was not designed to deal with living organisms. The laws are being used 
in ways that were not anticipated by the legislators, and the necessary 
public debate has not been undertaken. There is a series of profound 
ethical and moral questions raised by the spectre of patenting life 
forms. These questions have not been answered. Indeed, in light of the 
uniqueness of the issue, there has not been time even to formulate the 
questions adequately. Beyond the ethics issues, there is also a whole 
host of very important questions relating to the direction and focus of 
research in the life sciences. 
These issues are very disturbing from a Canadian perspective. 
The issues are magnified, and may even be of a different kind when 
one considers the implications of a strengthened intellectual property 
protection system covering the developing world as well. What is being 
contemplated within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and within bilateral trade negotiations is the wholesale 
transplantation of a system of legal protection to be used under very 
different social and economic conditions from those for which the 
system was designed. The system in question has not even been 
endorsed by the people of the exporting culture. The implications for 
the adopting culture may be quite severe and even countries that resist 
the pressure to adopt will not escape the effects. 
"Biotechnology promises to become an effective weapon in 
fighting such major evils as disease, malnutrition, plagues, energy 
deficits and pollution. Ergo, no country can afford not to consider it as 
a high priority." So begins a recent IDRC publication about 
biotechnologies for developing countries (Sercovich and Leopold 
1991). Statements of this kind are ubiquitous in government studies 
and reports, company strategies, and, especially, in the media and have 
been since the invention of a technique for "splicing genes" by Boyer 
and Cohen in 1973. There is great faith that science and technology 
will continue to lead to economic and quality-of-life improvements; 
biological-based engineering has been anointed as the way to improve 
the production of surplus in the industrial, agricultural, and health 
sectors. The hype, and that seems to be an accurate term, has been 
generated by biotech companies but has been willingly accepted by the 
public. 
The Lure of Profits 
The first biotech company, Genentech, out of California, was 
established by Herbert Boyer, one of the inventors of the process for 
splicing genes, in partnership with a venture capitalist. Ohio State 
University Researcher Dr Martin Kenney, in his 1986 investigation of 
the "University-Industry Complex," traces the history. 
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The two principals each invested $500 in the fledgling company 
and managed to get some startup capital from six investors. Boyer used 
the laboratory of the university where he was employed and, as Kenney 
puts it "Boyer, the officer of Genentech, contracted with Boyer, the 
professor, to perform research that would be proprietary, that is, 
patented private property at a public university." Genentech went public 
in October of 1980, offering one million shares at $35 a share. The 
price rocketed to $89 and settled at $70 at the close of the market day. 
Genentech, and many other such "startup" companies, benefited 
greatly from the public's willingness to believe in the potential of 
biotechnology. More than one hundred of these companies were 
formed in the U.S. in the 7 years following the establishment of 
Genentech, all involving university professors who brought with them 
knowledge generated during their employ in universities. A whole new 
class of millionaires was created, most of whom really had no product 
to sell. More than a decade later there are only eight biotech products 
on the U.S. market (Sercovich and Leopold 1991). 
The implications of publicly supported research being turned to 
private gain are discussed later. At this point, it is important to note 
that with very high levels of investment in biotechnology there is also 
strong political support. An obvious prerequisite for investment is some 
assurance that the investment will be rewarded. Biotechnology requires 
high levels of investment in research, but the results are easily and 
cheaply copied. The main requirement to ensure a return on the 
investment in research is some form of intellectual property protection. 
Governments of countries with well-developed research and 
development establishments have been quick to offer this protection to 
stimulate further investment. 
Creativity Rewarded 
As far back as 300 
B.C., cooks were 
granted exclusive rights 
to prepare "any 
peculiar and excellent 
dish in order that 
others might be 
induced to labour at 
excelling in such 
pursuits." 
The concept of intellectual product as property, that the benefits 
to creativity and ideas should be "protected," is not a new one. As far 
back as 300 B.C., cooks were granted exclusive rights to prepare "any 
peculiar and excellent dish in order that others might be induced to 
labour at excelling in such pursuits" (Price 1991). "Letters of Patent" 
were granted by monarchs in the Middle Ages giving exclusive rights to 
merchants to sell commodities and inventions (later limited to 
inventions). The modern patent system traces directly back to a statute 
from the republic of Venice, 19 March 1474. The concept of 
intellectual property protection governing living "inventions" is much 
newer, however. The first example of patents being applied to living 
organisms occurred in 1873 when Louis Pasteur was granted patents 
in the U.S. on some yeast strains that were "free from organic germs," 
but institutionalized mechanisms for the protection of plant varieties 
only really began in the 1930s, and that outside the patent system. 
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Ours is a society with a well-developed appreciation for ideas and 
technology. The benefits of research to society are recognized, and 
intellectual property rights are granted in this light. Ideas themselves 
may be expressed in artistic form, as music or literature, or may be 
embodied in products or processes. The latter we typically call 
"inventions," and this category will be the focus of this discussion. 
A Social Incentive 
The "exchange for 
secrets" thesis, holds 
that intellectual 
property protection is 
provided as society's 
part of a bargain with 
the inventor. 
Within the contemporary debate on intellectual property, two 
main rationale are typically used in defence of intellectual property 
rights: the "monopoly profit incentive," and the "exchange for secrets" 
theses (Primo Braga 1991a). The first assumes that without social 
incentives for the development of useful ideas, in reality incentives for 
research, there would be less investment in research than is socially 
desirable. The second, the "exchange for secrets" thesis, holds that 
intellectual property protection is provided as society's part of a bargain 
with the inventor. The inventor discloses technological secrets that 
might otherwise not be made available to society in return for an 
exclusive right to use and profit from the invention for a specified 
period of time. In many discussions these two notions, of incentive and 
of reward, are melded together. Intellectual property protection is seen 
as both incentive and reward for invention and disclosure. 
As in any contract, each side works to improve their position in 
the bargain. For the biotechnology industry, this means maximizing the 
protection afforded by society while minimizing the disclosure required. 
As will be discussed later, patents on living organisms seem to favour 
the inventor more than patents on other things. 
A variety of mechanisms has been devised for the protection of 
intellectual property. These fall into five major categories: patents (or 
industrial patents), plant breeders' rights (PBR), copyrights, trademarks, 
and trade secrets. The two main systems of interest for this discussion 
are patents and plant breeders' rights. 
Patenting Products or Processes 
A patent is intended to protect a particular product or a process 
that is the result of inventive thought. The patent permits the holder to 
forbid commercial exploitation (use, sale, manufacture) of the protected 
product or process by others in the country or countries where the 
patent is granted for a limited period (normally 17-20 years, but the 
period varies by country and product). Three specific conditions of 
eligibility must be met for patents. These conditions are fairly standard 
between countries, and include the following: 
Novelty - the invention must be new 
Utility - it must be useful 
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Inventiveness (or nonobviousness) - it must represent a real 
advance that might not have been reached without the inventor's 
creative insight. 
The patent application demands that the invention be disclosed in 
a way that enables the skilled public to reproduce it. The scope of the 
protection granted is proportional to the degree of inventiveness. 
Finally, the patent must relate to a technology for which patents 
are permitted. This is the area in which the most variation occurs 
between countries' patent legislation. Usually, the invention must be 
capable of industrial application - for example, an industrial process or 
product, and not merely an idea, discovery, artistic work, or business 
scheme. Each country has the responsibility to decide on the 
appropriate scope of patentability to suit its own particular 
socioeconomic situation. 
Such things as food, drugs, and agriculture have at various times 
and places been excluded to keep prices down (to make it cheap and 
easy to imitate and adapt existing technologies and products). Most 
developing countries currently do not grant patents on pharmaceuticals 
for this reason. Similarly, some prohibit patents on agricultural 
innovations. Rapid changes, however, are occurring in the scope of 
patentability, with an evident trend to encompass all products and 
processes, including living organisms. 
Plant Breeders' Rights 
Plant breeders' rights (PBR), known in Europe as plant variety 
protection (PVP), is a specific system of protection designed for plant 
varieties. It has analogies to patents, but also some important 
differences. As with patents, rights are granted for a limited period of 
time (typically 17-20 years) to the breeder of the specific unit of plant 
material that constitutes a plant variety. 
To be eligible for protection, a variety must be: 
New - the variety must not previously have been exploited 
commercially 
Distinct - it must be clearly distinguishable from all other varieties 
known at the date of application for protection 
Uniform - all plants of the variety must be sufficiently uniform to 
allow it to be distinguished from other varieties taking into account 
the method of reproduction of the species 
Stable - It must be possible for the variety to be reproduced 
unchanged. 
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The Paris and UPOV Conventions 
Although each of the foregoing intellectual property protection 
mechanisms are written and treated as national laws, international 
agreements are in effect and are designed to broaden coverage to the 
international level. The two main international agreements of interest 
are the Paris Convention concerning patents and trademarks, and the 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(UPOV Convention), which covers plant breeders' rights. 
The Paris Convention, originated in 1883, now has 99 signatory 
nations. Signatories retain a high degree of flexibility and autonomy in 
setting national laws (e.g., determining what will be patentable). The 
main provisions are for national treatment (nonnationals from signatory 
countries are to be given the same treatment as nationals) and priority 
rights when filing for a patent that has already been filed for in another 
signatory nation. A specialized agency of the United Nations, the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), administers the convention 
along with most other international treaties on patents and trademarks. 
The UPOV Convention, which deals only with plant varieties, is 
much more rigid, requiring that members adopt its standards and scope 
of protection as national law. In spite of this requirement, national laws 
have not been absolutely standard in their application. The UPOV 
convention was adopted initially in 1961 by five European countries, 
and membership was restricted to European countries until 1978. At 
that time, the convention was revised and membership opened to all 
countries. 
There are currently 20 member states including most EC 
countries, several other European countries (Hungary, Poland, Sweden, 
Switzerland), Japan, the U.S., and a few others. Canada became party 
to the Convention on 4 March 1991. Although UPOV is open to all 
countries with compatible plant breeders' rights legislation, there are no 
developing-country members. None so far have been convinced that 
the benefits of membership outweigh the costs of administration and 
the lost opportunity of free use of varieties protected elsewhere. UPOV 
maintains a secretariat in the WIPO offices. 
The UPOV Convention has resulted in a high degree of 
standardization among the 20 developed-country signatories. There are 
a few other countries that have analogous legislation (e.g., Argentina, 
Chile, Cuba). Patent legislation, however, is much more widely utilized, 
but there is a very low level of standardization; the level and scope of 
patent protection available, especially with regard to living organisms, is 
extremely variable and rapidly changing. 
Patents and plant breeders' rights have quite different implications 
with regard to breadth of coverage and utilization of the protected 
material in subsequent research and production of propagating 
materials and of crops for sale. In theory at least, any product or 
process can be patented, but only plant varieties are covered by plant 
breeders' rights. 
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Canada and UPOV 
After two failed attempts (in 1980 
and 1988 bills for plant breeders' rights 
were introduced in Parliament but died on 
the order papers), Canada adopted a Plant 
Breeders' Rights Act on 19 June 1990. 
Bill C-15 provides for the granting of 
plant breeders' rights to new varieties of 
plants that meet the criteria of 
distinctiveness, stability, and uniformity; the 
variety must not have been previously 
exploited commercially; it must be clearly 
distinguishable from other varieties known 
at the date of application; and all plants of 
the variety must be sufficiently similar to 
one another in a single generation and must 
not change significantly over time. The 
holder of the right is granted the exclusive 
right to advertise, sell, and produce 
reproductive material of a protected variety 
in Canada for 18 years. The holder also has 
the right to authorize others, with or 
without condition, to use the protected 
material. In addition, a compulsory licence 
may be granted by the Commissioner to 
any person; the Commissioner must 
consider the availability to the public of 
propagating material at reasonable prices, 
the distribution of the variety, and the 
reasonable remuneration of the rights 
holder. 
The regulations pursuant to the Act 
are expected to be passed in the fall of 
1991 (Mooi 1991). Initially, six categories 
of plants will be eligible for protection: 
wheat, canola, soybean, potatoes, roses, 
and chrysanthemum. New categories will be 
added on a regular basis. 
With the passage of the Plant 
Breeders' Rights Act, the door was open to 
membership in UPOV. Canada became 
signatory to that Convention on 4 March 
1991 under the conditions of the 1978 
Convention. In March, there was a 
Diplomatic Conference in Geneva at which 
further revisions to the Convention were 
approved. 
These revisions effectively strengthen 
the protection afforded by plant variety 
protection legislation. The main changes 
are: 
A provision was added to prevent the 
unauthorized exploitation of any variety 
that is "essentially derived" from a 
protected variety (a variety is considered 
to be essentially derived for this purpose 
when it is derived from the protected 
variety and retains virtually the entire 
genetic structure of the protected 
variety). 
The revised Convention extends the 
breeder's right to harvested material 
produced from propagating material 
whose use was not authorized by the 
breeder, unless the breeder has had 
reasonable opportunity to exercise his or 
her right in relation to the propagating 
material. The breeder's right, under the 
revised Convention, could be used to 
restrict the import of harvested material 
resulting from the unauthorized use of 
propagated material of his or her variety. 
The revised Convention now extends the 
breeder's right to cover the use of 
farm-saved seed as planting material. 
Countries are free to limit the breeder's 
right (to specify that farmers can replant 
seed of a protected variety that they 
have grown), and most countries are 
expected to do so (Keystone 1991). 
The 1991 Convention now lifts the 
prohibition on plant variety protection 
for patented varieties (ban on double 
protection); UPOV member states 
accordingly can offer patents as an 
optional alternative to plant breeders' 
rights for plant varieties or to grant both 
plant variety and patent protection for 
the same variety. 
Canada will have to amend the Plant 
Breeders' Rights Act to accommodate these 
changes before ratifying the 1991 version 
of the UPOV Convention. 
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Patents Unlimited? 
Patents are available on processes used to develop modified 
organisms or to produce biological products. Such patents, often 
described as "process patents," in general fall within the category of 
procedures for which patents were designed and are not particularly 
controversial. Arguments against such patents, which are sometimes 
raised, are more correctly arguments against biotechnology per se. 
In the U.S., patents have been granted for specific plant and 
animal varieties. These varieties could be protected using plant 
breeders' rights but, claiming a degree of inventiveness, patent 
protection has been granted. This seems to give the patent holder the 
authority to restrict use of the patented variety for breeding purposes, 
protection not offered by plant breeders' rights. 
Patent protection is also available in a number of countries for 
plants that contain a novel gene. For a gene to qualify as something 
"not found in nature" it must be either novel in and of itself (i.e., created 
by the inventor), or transferred to a species in which it is not found in 
nature (Barton and Siebec 1991). Such patents (on genes) seem to 
imply that the holder of the right could prohibit others from engaging 
in unauthorized commercial activity involving any plant material of the 
protected species. Protection may extend to cover closely related 
species to which the transferred gene could be moved using 
conventional breeding techniques. 
Finally, and most controversial, the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office has granted a patent on a plant characteristic. The American 
biotechnology company, Molecular Genetics Inc., developed a variety 
of maize that produces high levels of the amino acid tryptophan. The 
company's patent claims a monopoly over any high, tryptophan- 
producing maize regardless of the process by which this characteristic is 
achieved. This broad claim remains to be challenged in court. With 
similar broad claims in the area of chemical production, the courts have 
tended to find evidence of infringement only when the product in 
question has been made by the process described in the patent (Barton 
1991). 
The U.S. has the strongest intellectual property protection, 
considering all "non-naturally occurring non-human multicellular living 
organisms, including animals, to be patentable subject matter" (OTA 
1989). Patents in the U.S. may be granted to anyone who invents or 
"discovers" any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof. 
As it stands in Canada, microorganisms are considered 
patentable, and have been since 1982. This includes viruses, bacteria, 
fungi (including yeasts), unicellular algae, protozoa, or cell lines. In fact, 
human cell lines are considered to fall within this category and have 
been patented in Canada. As long as the cells possess uniform 
characteristics (do not differentiate), they are considered patentable. 
Higher life forms are currently not considered patentable by the 
Canadian Patent Office. 
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The breeder of the first 
blue rose, for instance, 
cannot monopolize 
blueness. 
In Europe, patents are granted for microorganisms. Although the 
European Patent Convention excepts patent protection for plant and 
animal varieties (Art.53(b)), several patents have been granted by the 
European Patent Office on plants (DGIS 1991). A patent application 
on the "Harvard Mouse" was rejected under this article. Decisions on 
both plant and mouse patents are being appealed. In Japan, plant 
varieties per se are protected under plant breeders' rights, whereas 
processes for developing new varieties may be patented. 
Under plant breeders' rights (and unlike the case of patents in the 
U.S.), the breeder of a protected plant variety cannot seek exclusive 
rights in a unique characteristic of his or her variety. The breeder of the 
first blue rose, for instance, cannot monopolize blueness. It is open to 
all other breeders to breed and protect blue roses that are distinct from 
the first such variety. 
Encouraging Further Research 
Patent laws in most nations provide research exemptions that 
allow the use of a patented innovation for experimental purposes 
(Barton 1991). After all, the purpose of the patent system is to 
stimulate innovation. Yet biotechnology-industry lobbyists are pushing 
for wider patent-holder control of patented organisms. 
The U.S. law does not have any research exemption, and case 
law precedents (principally in the area of pharmaceuticals) suggest that 
"experimentation is permissable only to satisfy academic curiosity and 
not for commercial purposes" (Barton 1991). In the U.S., a patented 
blue rose could not be used for further development without the 
permission of the patent holder and probably a royalty payment. 
Protecting Plant Varieties 
Plant variety protection legislation, however, has important limits 
designed to facilitate continued improvement of protected varieties. 
Under the so-called Breeders' Exemption, any protected plant variety 
can be freely used as a plant genetic resource for the purpose of 
breeding other varieties; i.e., the blue rose referred to in the foregoing 
could be used in a breeding program to develop, for instance, a 
thornless blue rose. A provision is made to prevent the unauthorized 
exploitation of any variety that is considered to be "essentially derived" 
from a protected variety (a variety is considered to be essentially derived 
for this purpose when it is derived from the protected variety and 
retains virtually the entire genetic structure of the protected variety). 
The breeder's permission is required for the repeated use of his or her 
variety as a parent line to produce, for example, a hybrid. 
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A safety feature designed into plant breeders' rights legislation 
and into most patent systems (including the Canadian laws) allows the 
state to grant the same rights that the holder of the patent or plant 
variety protection certificate might grant. A "Compulsory Licence" of 
this type is used to ensure maximum benefit to society from an 
invention; i.e., the patent holder is prevented from using his or her 
monopoly in an exceedingly exploitative way or from withholding the 
invention from the public. The grantee of a compulsory licence must 
pay "reasonable" royalty fees to the patent holder. 
Reproduction Control 
Thus, current patent 
laws would seem to 
make patents on living 
organisms more far 
reaching than patents 
on nonliving things. 
Normally, with patents on nonliving things, the purchaser of a 
patented product can use the product without any restriction, but is 
prohibited from copying it for commercial use. Living organisms, 
however, are self-reproducing; they copy themselves. To uphold the 
rights of inventors to exclusive rights over their invention means 
abrogating the purchaser's right to unrestricted use of his or her 
purchase. As it now stands, patents on living organisms may permit the 
holder to restrict use of a protected variety for breeding purposes. 
Under this interpretation, a farmer purchasing seed of a patented 
variety may plant the seed and sell the crop as a crop, but would be 
prohibited from selling seed (or other propagating material). In fact, 
strictly speaking, the farmer may be prohibited from using that crop as 
seed for a subsequent planting (Barton and Siebeck 1991). Thus, 
current patent laws would seem to make patents on living organisms 
more far reaching than patents on nonliving things. Case law will 
eventually define the bounds. 
This idea of restricting farmers from replanting their own seed is 
very much contrary to the traditions of North American farmers (using 
nonhybrids) and farmers throughout much of the world. For example, 
Canadian wheat farmers buy only about 15-20% of their wheat seed 
from a seed company. Most of their seed is saved seed from the 
previous year's crop. 
Under the 1978 version of the UPOV Convention, there was no 
mention of restricting farmers from planting saved seed. There have 
been some serious abuses of the right of farmers to plant their own 
seed, referred to as plantback, particularly in the U.S., with some very 
large-scale corporate farms producing their own seed. To deal with this, 
the 1991 UPOV revision extends the Convention to cover farmer 
plantback and could be used to prevent farmers from replanting seed of 
a protected variety that they have grown. Countries, however, are free 
to limit the breeders' right to permit fanner plantback; most countries 
are expected to do so for most varieties (Keystone 1991). In any event, 
a law to prohibit individual, small-scale farmers from planting saved 
seed would be virtually unenforceable. Advocates for small-scale farmers 
in developing countries, however, have expressed concern that laws of 
this type could provide a means of harassment for political or other 
ends (Montecinos, personal communication). 
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It is the effects on trade, 
however, and the 
Incipient pressures that 
leveloped countries are 
able to put on developing 
;ountries to adopt 
intellectual property 
protection that causes 
the greatest concern. 
In the case of either plant variety protection or patents, no direct 
mechanism prevents the use of protected material outside of the 
jurisdiction of the protection. An animal variety patented in the U.S. 
can be used in a breeding program in Argentina without infringing 
Argentinean patent law. As described later, however, any attempt to 
export the progeny to the U.S. may be considered a contravention of 
U.S. trade law, with strong sanctions. 
In theory, it could be argued that plant variety protection and 
patents in developed countries pose little threat for developing 
countries. It is the effects on trade, however, and the incipient 
pressures that developed countries are able to put on developing 
countries to adopt intellectual property protection that causes the 
greatest concern. This is discussed in more detail later. 
Trade Secrets 
No discussion of patent protection would be complete without 
some mention of the alternative - trade secrets. This is the option of 
not disclosing information or not making materials available. 
Information can be protected by physical measures of secrecy and by 
restrictive contracts entered into with employees, users, and others to 
whom the secrets may be revealed. At its broadest, a trade secret is 
anything that is secret and confers upon its owners a competitive 
advantage. Trade secret laws are in place in many countries as a means 
of applying sanctions to those who improperly reveal or acquire trade 
secrets. For example, the law may be used to protect confidential 
information held by an employee hired by a competitor. National laws 
may protect trade secrets as legal property (e.g., U.S.), as a contract, or 
as an aspect of ethical business practices (e.g., Germany) (Lesser 
1991a). Once a secret is lost, however, no protection applies, unless it 
can be shown that the secret was improperly acquired. This is also true 
if valuable information can be deciphered by examining products in 
which the information is used; i.e., reverse engineering. 
It is effective "secrecy," for example, that enables breeders of 
hybrid varieties to ensure their exclusive use. Hybrids, the first 
generation from a cross between specific lines, often have a large 
potential yield advantage over conventional varieties. If seeds of the 
next generation are sown, however, much of this advantage is lost. 
Thus, by keeping strict control of the parent lines, breeders of hybrids 
are able to maintain effective "rights" over the hybrid variety itself. 
It is this option that concerns the proponents of strengthened 
intellectual property protection. Information kept secret can not be 
used by society except in the form of the ultimate product of the 
invention (which may or may not be marketed). There is the potential 
for unnecessary duplication of research. Patents offer an incentive to 
the private sector to make public the results of their research. 
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Patents and Free Trade 
A number of bilateral and multilateral initiatives have been taken, 
and others are currently underway, designed to "harmonize" intellectual 
property protection worldwide. "Harmonization" for most if not all 
countries will mean introducing much stricter intellectual property 
protection. 
Attempts to strengthen intellectual property protection regimes 
globally have been underway for more than a decade. Initially, WIPO 
served as the main forum, with a "committee of Experts on 
Biotechnological Property and Industrial Property" established in 1984, 
and efforts to develop a new treaty on the protection of industrial 
property since 1985 (DGIS 1991). Conventions, however, require wide 
approval. Industrialized countries have been unsuccessful in getting the 
higher intellectual property protection standards they would like 
adopted in other countries through WIPO. 
Some countries, led by the U.S., have subsequently embarked on 
bilateral negotiations to secure stronger protection for the intellectual 
property of their nationals. The U.S. uses its General System of 
Preferences (GSP), granting favoured-trading status only to those 
nations who meet rigid intellectual property protecting standards. 
Following strengthening of U.S. trade law in 1988, some 42 countries 
were identified as having intellectual property laws deemed harmful to 
U.S. interests. Pressure has been exerted on these countries, through 
the GSP, with punitive duties on imports from the countries in 
question. The EC has similar commercial policy instruments available to 
deal with intellectual property rights issues. In 1987, for example, the 
EC suspended GSP benefits for Korean products to retaliate against 
Korea's provision of preferential intellectual property protection for 
American intellectual property, itself won through the imposition of 
trade pressures (Primo Braga 1991b). 
Potentially more far ranging in its effect is that intellectual 
property considerations are included as one of 15 negotiating subjects 
in the current (Uruguay) round of the GATT. A negotiating group on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), including Trade 
in Counterfeit Goods, was established at the insistence of the U.S., with 
support from Japan and the EC, and is considered one of the top 
priorities by the U.S. By bringing intellectual property protection issues 
into the GATT discussion, industrialized countries can pressure 
developing countries to strengthen their intellectual property 
protections. Although no country would have to sign any final GATT 
agreement, there may be strong pressures, and clear benefits in other 
areas, to do so. 
Within these discussions, very little attention has been focused on 
property protection as related to living organisms. Far from calming 
fears, this fact underlines the danger that patent protection applicable 
to living organisms will be adopted on a very wide scale as an almost 
incidental part of a much larger trade deal. It is very likely that the 
profound and far-reaching questions raised by this issue will not even be 
evaluated before the decision is taken. 
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very country should 
>cide whether and to 
hat extent they should 
lopt such protection on 
; own merit. 
Even though the discussion is wanting, the positions have been 
mapped out. Everything should be patentable according to the U.S., 
Japan, and Switzerland (presumably excluding human beings as in 
current U.S. law). The EC position has been more moderate. They 
would leave decisions on exclusions of animals and biological processes 
up to individual countries (DGIS 1991). Fourteen developing countries 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Peru, Tanzania, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe) propose to exclude 
materials existing in nature, along with plant and animal varieties and 
processes for the production of plant and animal varieties, from patent 
protection. 
Canada's position has been that patents should be available for all 
products and processes in all fields of technology, but that countries 
should be free to exempt certain things, including multicellular life 
forms or processes for producing new multicellular life forms (GATT 
1989). In light of the incomplete analysis that has been done on the 
potential implications of such legislation (including the ethical 
implications), Canada supports the view that countries should be free to 
develop legislation appropriate to their own needs. 
With or without GATT TRIPs, it appears quite likely that many 
developing countries are going to be coerced into adopting 
strengthened protection regimes. Intellectual property is being treated 
as a trade issue and not as a research issue. Under these kinds of 
conditions, with the principal focus on trade-related issues, it is very 
unlikely that adequate consideration will be given to the needs or design 
of the resulting protection systems. Intellectual property protection for 
living organisms is likely to be included as part of the overall package, 
with serious ethical implications and with considerable potential to alter 
the research environment globally. 
This trend to link intellectual property protection relating to living 
organisms to trade agreements, both bilateral and multilateral, is cause 
for serious concern. Every country should decide whether and to what 
extent they should adopt such protection on its own merit. The issue 
must be given adequate discussion and evaluation at the national level 
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Who's Ll .fe Is it? 
Life As Property 
The concept that an 
individual could "own it a 
piece of land was foreign 
to North American 
natives and probably 
quite incomprehensible. 
The concept of patenting a living organism strikes many as being 
somehow wrong. Western society has a long tradition of ownership of 
physical property. Indeed, everything on earth has at one time been 
considered eligible to be treated as property. Human beings are now 
excepted, but only after a long and very painful period during which 
human beings too were subject to treatment as commodities. 
This tradition of property is not shared by all societies. Aboriginal 
societies the world over have had much narrower definitions of private 
property. North American native peoples have suffered enormously 
because they did not have a system of land ownership and suddenly 
came up against a rapidly expanding culture that treated land and 
everything on it as a commodity. The concept that an individual could 
"own" a piece of land was foreign to North American natives and 
probably quite incomprehensible. 
That kind of foreignness seems to be manifest in the reactions 
even of many Westerners, accustomed as we are to crass 
commercialism, when introduced to the concept of ownership of a 
variety of plant or animal. That every offspring of every offspring of an 
individual which has been modified in some way should, in a sense, 
"belong" to he or she who did the modifying seems wrong to many. 
The debate on this issue really only began in 1980 when the 
American Supreme Court ruled that a living organism, in this case a 
genetically engineered bacterium, could be patented (Diamond u 
Chakrabarty). In 1985, the same court ruled that plants and seeds 
were eligible for patent coverage (Ex parte Hibberd), and, finally, in 
1987, that animals could be patented (Ex parte Allen) (Lesser 1991b). 
In this last case, a patent was granted for a genetically engineered 
mouse that contains human genes. 
Because it is such a new area, the issues are still in the process of 
being defined. Neither side in the debate has adequately marshalled 
their arguments on the ethical and moral aspects of patenting life 
forms. A recent statement by religious leaders in the U.S. called for a 
moratorium on animal patenting to allow time for thoughtful reflection 
and judgement (Brody 1989). It will be useful to examine and weigh 
some of the main arguments. 
Patents for Mousetraps, Not Mice 
First of all, it must be made clear that utility patents were not 
designed for living organisms. Patent laws were drafted before the 
advent of technologies that made possible the wide genetic 
recombinations and other genetic manipulation techniques that are now 
practiced. 
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The language of the laws does not indicate that the legislators 
considered the laws that they were drafting to be applicable to living 
organisms. Indeed, the act of passing plant breeders' rights legislation 
suggests that Parliament recognized that plants at least are not eligible 
for patent protection. 
The divergence of current practice from the intent of the law is 
demonstrated well by the difficulties encountered with the disclosure 
requirements of patent law. The Canadian Patent Act requires an 
applicant to "...correctly and fully describe the invention and its 
operation or use as contemplated by the inventor..." and to "...set out 
clearly the various steps in a process, or method of constructing, 
making, compounding or using a machine, manufacture or composition 
of matter, in such full, clear, concise and exact terms as to enable any 
person skilled in the art or science to make, construct, compound or 
use it...." The U.S. law is similar in substance. 
Complete Disclosure? 
For some biological inventions though, adequate description is 
practically or even technically impossible. To overcome this difficulty, it 
has become common practice in some countries to allow a deposit of 
the biological material to supplement the disclosure. The sample is 
made available to others so that they may reproduce the organism and 
thus have access to the invention for research purposes and unlimited 
use once the patent expires. 
Canada's Patent Act does not mention deposits but, as a matter 
of practice, the Canadian Patent Office was accepting reference in a 
patent disclosure to a deposit of biological materials. This practice was 
specifically addressed by the Commissioner of Patents in 1982 in Re 
Application of Abitibi Co. This case concerned an application for a 
patent on a process for biodegrading waste from the manufacture of 
wood pulp, including the microbial culture system composed of five 
species of yeast. The patent on the process had been accepted but, the 
Patent Examiner rejected the claim on the microbial culture system on 
the grounds that living organisms were not considered patentable 
subject matter. The Commissioner overturned the rejection, and in the 
decision affirmed the practice of using deposits. 
A subsequent Supreme Court decision has raised doubts about the 
practice. The case of Pioneer Hi-Bred Limited u The Commissioner 
of Patents is interesting both from the perspective of the disclosure 
issue and because it serves well to illustrate the uncertain situation in 
Canada on patenting of multicellular organisms. The initial application 
by Pioneer Hi-Bred for a patent on a new soybean variety was rejected 
by the Patent Office Examiner and then by the Patent Appeal Board, 
both finding that the invention was not patentable within the meaning 
of the Patent Act. The Patent Appeal Board further indicated that a 
limited interpretation should be given to the word "invention," and that 
the soybean variety did not qualify. (Canada had not enacted its plant 
breeders' rights legislation at the time.) 
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Pioneer brought an appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal in 
1987, which was rejected, and in the process new issues were raised. 
Two judges gave the opinion that Canadian Patent Legislation does not 
expressly exclude living organisms from patentability, but ruled that the 
soybean variety could not be regarded as an invention. 
Besides, speaking of the intention of Parliament, given that plant 
breeding was well established when the Act was passed, it seems to 
me that the inclusion of plants within the purview of the legislation 
would have led first to a definition of invention in which words 
such as "strain," "variety" or "hybrid" would have appeared, and 
second to the enactment of special provisions capable of better 
adapting the whole scheme to a subject matter, the essential 
characteristic of which is that it reproduces itself as a necessary 
result of its growth and maturity. (Marceau 1987) 
The minority judge, raised the issue of disclosure and stated both 
that "...even a complete and accurate disclosure by the appellant of 
everything that the alleged inventor did to develop the new plant would 
not enable others to obtain the same results unless they, by chance, 
would benefit from the same good fortune.", and "The use of seeds 
deposited by the appellant is, in a sense, the use of the invention itself. 
Subsection 36(1), as I read it, requires that the description be such that 
third persons, who do not have access to the invention or anything 
produced by it, be enabled to reproduce it." 
The subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada 
(judgment rendered in 1989) was also rejected on similar grounds. The 
Supreme Court considered that the breeding techniques used to 
develop the variety were not adequately described and further ruled that 
the deposit of seed did not comply with the requirement for complete 
description. The Court distinguishes the Pioneer ruling from the Abitibi 
case on the grounds that the patent application in the latter was not for 
the microorganism deposited but for a process that used that 
microorganism. In fact, this distinction does not seem to be correct 
(Morrow 1991). 
The Supreme Court did not rule, as many had hoped that they 
would, on the patentability of plant varieties or multicellular organisms 
generally. The justices found it neither "necessary nor desirable ...to 
consider... whether this new soybean variety can be regarded as an 
invention...." 
In spite of the distinction made from the Abitibi case, the 
Canadian Patent Office has tightened its criteria for disclosure. 
Reference to deposits in recognized depositories continues to be 
accepted, but the written description must stand on its own - at least 
until the law is changed. The disclosure requirements of the Patent Act 
are in the process of being amended to allow for the deposit of 
biological material as part of a patent application and to consider that 
deposit as part of the written description. 
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Moreover, a recent meeting of the Intellectual Property Advisory 
Committee favourably reviewed a proposal for Canada to join the 
Budapest Treaty. (The 1977 Budapest Treaty on the International 
Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purpose of 
Patent Procedure allows for a single deposit of a microorganism with 
an International Depository Authority in any member state and obviates 
the need to make a separate deposit in every country where patent 
protection is sought.) This is a very significant change and would open 
the door to broader use of patent law to protect living organisms. 
Devaluing Life 
Yet patents on living 
organisms do not reflect 
the distinction that our 
society has traditionally 
made between living and 
nonliving, between 
animals and machines. 
One of the principal arguments against patents on life forms is 
that they devalue life. Patents, as a mechanism of social policy, should 
reflect a society's ideals and traditional values. Yet patents on living 
organisms do not reflect the distinction that our society has traditionally 
made between living and nonliving, between animals and machines. 
Canadian and U.S. law authorizes patents on any new "machine, 
manufacture or composition of matter." The Canadian decision on 
patenting microorganisms was somewhat ambiguous, referring to them 
as "manufactures or compositions of matter." The American court put 
microorganisms, and higher forms, within the category of 
"compositions of matter." Obviously, such a reduction in the legal 
definition of life raises serious questions. 
The responses to the argument that patents on life devalue life 
have not been particularly strong. Baruch Brody (1989), an American 
professor of philosophy and an expert in biomedical ethics, addresses 
this argument and dismisses it in the following way: "Even those who 
believe that living beings are more than compositions of matter believe 
that they are at least compositions of matter, and it is only as 
compositions of matter that we patent them." This rebuttal seems to be 
flawed. We do not, and certainly should not, apply the law in such a 
reductionist manner. Otherwise, there could be no argument against 
patenting human beings, as we too are "at least compositions of 
matter." 
Brody himself later turns to a different argument, quoting Leroy 
Walters (Committee on the Judiciary 1988): "When compared with the 
ethical issues involved in our breeding, buying, selling, confining, 
eating, and performing research on animals, the ethical questions 
surrounding animal patents seem relatively less important...." This is a 
very weak position, suggesting that the ethical considerations are 
relatively less important than others and should, therefore, be 
dismissed. 
Barry Hoffmaster (1989), associate professor of philosophy at the 
University of Western Ontario, seems to miss the point in his effort to 
rebut the arguments against patenting life. He starts by citing Jeremy 
Rifkin, a leading opponent of patents on life in the U.S., who has 
criticized the patenting of animals on the grounds that the decision 
legitimizes the privatization for commercial profit of the entire animal 
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kingdom. Hoffmaster selects this quote, characterizes it as typical of the 
argument, and quickly dismisses it because animals are already 
marketplace commodities. He confuses the concept of physical 
property, the buying and selling of individual animals, with the very 
different concept of intellectual property and the extension of that idea 
that vests exclusive rights of exploitation of an organism and all its 
progeny to an "inventor" who has "modified" that organiser. 
None of the arguments cited in the foregoing seem to invalidate 
the concern that patents on living organisms reduce society's concept 
of life and serve to blur the distinction between the animate and the 
inanimate. The main concern of this argument is not with the patents 
per se, but with the institutionalization of a reduced definition of life. 
This naturally leads to concerns that social barriers preventing 
maltreatment of other living organisms will be lowered and to related 
concerns that human life will be similarly devalued. 
Simultaneous to this discussion on patents and their implications 
there has been a much larger "revision," at least in some quarters, of 
human relations with the larger environment. This is expressed in a 
variety of ways, from "deep ecology," increasing concern for animal 
rights, to the growing environmental movement. These new ideas 
should be considered in the debate on patenting life as legitimate 
antitheses to the commercial and trade interests. 
Religious Arguments 
If a society determines 
that it does not approve 
of certain technologies, it 
should assess very 
critically all policy 
instruments that may 
encourage the 
technologies in question. 
There is a family of arguments based on metaphysical and 
theological grounds that rejects the idea that humankind should tamper 
with God's creation. These include the notion that a species has a right 
to exist as a separate species and that the introduction of genes from 
another species contravenes this right; humankind is entrusted with the 
responsibility to preserve the integrity of life; humankind should not 
attempt to usurp the organic, natural, or God-given powers of 
reproduction and species evolution; producing new life forms simply for 
the sake of profit is morally offensive; and it is inappropriate to grant a 
patent for an invention that involves transferring human genetic 
material to animals (Hertz, unpublished). 
Many of these are more correctly arguments against recombinant 
DNA work than they are against patents (Brody 1989; Hoffmaster 
1989). However, insofar as patents countenance and, indeed, 
encourage biotechnology, including biotechnology that is not widely 
approved of (e.g., transferring human genes to animals), there is a 
danger of sending a mixed policy message. If a society determines that 
it does not approve of certain technologies, it should assess very 
critically all policy instruments that may encourage the technologies in 
question. 
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A number of other concerns fall into the antibiotechnology 
category as well. These revolve around the environmental and health 
implications of releasing genetically engineered organisms and the 
potential that recombinant DNA technology will lead to increased 
suffering by animals. 
Fairness 
There is a very strong "fairness" issue that must be considered. 
Every living organism is a product of millions of years of natural 
evolution and, in the case of most domesticated species, considerable 
human selection and human-induced change as well. Now, by 
generating a relatively very small change in an organism, it is possible 
to gain legal control over the exploitation of the modified organism and 
all of its progeny (for 20 years or so). What was considered the 
common heritage of humankind becomes the private property of a few. 
Referring to the landmark Chakrabarty case in the U.S. in which 
the court found that Chakrabarty "has produced a new bacterium with 
markedly different characteristics than any found in nature...", Key 
Dismukes, Study Director of the Committee on Vision of the National 
Academy of Sciences in the U.S. said: 
Let us at least get one thing straight: Ananda Chakrabarty did not 
create a new form of life; he merely intervened in the normal 
processes by which strains of bacteria exchange genetic 
information, to produce a new strain with an altered metabolic 
pattern. "His" bacterium lives and reproduces itself under the 
forces that guide all cellular life. Recent advances in recombinant 
DNA techniques allow more direct biochemical manipulation of 
bacterial genes than Chakrabarty employed, but these too are only 
modulations of biological processes. We are incalculably far away 
from being able to create life de novo, and for that I am profoundly 
grateful. The argument that the bacterium is Chakrabarty's 
handiwork and not nature's wildly exaggerates human power and 
displays the same hubris and ignorance of biology that have had 
such devastating impact on the ecology of our planet. 
A somewhat related point on fairness is that much of the 
background research that underlies any patentable development has 
been, and will probably continue to be, publicly funded. Such 
"upstream" research, without the possibility of immediate application, 
does not lend itself to research that is privately funded. Yet the results 
are often employed in applied research that does result in patentable 
discoveries, the rewards of which are appropriated privately. At best 
this can be seen as a public subsidy to industry. In other cases, such as 
where university and other publicly supported researchers form 
companies to exploit the results of "their" research, it appears both 
inequitable and unethical. 
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Genetic Erosion 
Since the dawn of agriculture, many 
thousands of years ago, farmers have 
continually sought to improve the crops 
they have grown. As agricultural 
communities have spread around the globe, 
they have taken their crops with them and, 
through continual selection, have developed 
a vast array of different types, known as 
landraces, adapted to different 
environments and needs. This variation 
provides the main raw material for crop 
improvement today and for the future. 
Unfortunately, much of this diversity 
is now threatened. Many of the traditionally 
grown landraces no longer exist. They have 
been replaced by "modem" varieties - 
indeed it is ironic that the success of plant 
breeding has itself been the major cause of 
the loss of the raw material on which future 
advances in crop improvement depend. 
Instead of a huge patchwork of different 
landraces of a crop, many parts of the 
world are now covered by a comparatively 
small number of varieties that themselves 
are often closely related. 
The requirements of modern 
agriculture for uniform product, whether for 
field mechanization or processing, have 
further exacerbated the situation. In 
addition, for a variety to be eligible for plant 
breeders' rights, it must be sufficiently 
uniform to be able to distinguish it from 
other varieties - again resulting in less 
variation than is commonly found within 
traditional landraces. 
As modem plant breeding extends its 
impact to more and more crop species and 
in ever more agricultural environments, so 
traditional genetic diversity is being 
progressively lost. The situation, referred to 
as genetic erosion, is now critical for many 
species and in many parts of the world. 
The replacement of landraces by new 
varieties is, however, not the only cause of 
genetic erosion. As food habits change, or 
as shifts occur in the profitability of certain 
crops compared to others, so the total area 
grown to a particular crop can change 
dramatically. As farmers, for whatever 
reason, abandon certain crops there is a 
great danger in losing the variation that 
originally occurred within them. If, in the 
future, trends are reversed, much of the 
variation needed to revive a crop and to 
adapt it to the new conditions will no longer 
occur. 
In addition to the loss of landraces, 
many wild species, relatives of cultivated 
types and, hence, also of value in future 
crop improvement, are also threatened. 
This can occur through the destruction of 
the habitats, for example, through the 
expansion of urban areas, deforestation, or 
the widespread degradation of ecosystems 
caused by overgrazing. The situation is 
expected to get worse in the future if global 
climatic change occurs and leads to major 
shifts in plant ecosystems. Again, an ironic 
situation - climate change resulting in the 
loss of genetic diversity that itself will be 
badly needed to tailor our crops to produce 
adequately under new climatic regimes. 
The seriousness of the situation is 
being increasingly recognized and attempts 
to redress it are taking place throughout the 
world. Many countries have established 
gene banks to preserve traditional 
landraces, varieties, and wild species in cold 
storage. Increasingly, efforts are also being 
made to conserve materials in the field, 
either on farm in the case of traditional 
landraces and varieties, or in special habitat 
reserves in the case of wild species. 
These efforts, however, although 
impressive, remain inadequate. Additional 
funding and other resources, as well as 
further knowledge about optimum 
conservation methods and strategies, is 
urgently required. The situation is especially 
acute in some of the developing countries - the very countries that have given rise to 
so much of the genetic variation used 
throughout the world today. 
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The fairness Issue is particularly acute when patents are 
considered from the perspective of developing countries. Almost all the 
major agricultural crops originated in the tropics and subtropics in areas 
that are now developing countries. Most of our domestic animals 
originated in these regions as well. These regions remain centres of 
diversity from which germplasm has been collected over the years and 
adapted, through selection and breeding, to use in European and North 
American conditions. In Canada and the U.S., as well as in northern 
Europe, Australia, northern Asia, and the Mediterranean, more than 
90% of agricultural production is derived from introduced species (Reid 
1991). 
Of course, efforts have also been directed at developing improved 
varieties for use in tropical conditions, with considerable success in a 
number of cases. Perhaps the most noteworthy of these has been the 
development and spread of the dwarf, high-yield potential rice and 
wheat varieties in the late 1960s and 1970s, which gave rise to the 
green revolution." The results have had mixed reviews; it has certainly 
been possible to feed many more people than would have been 
possible without these improved varieties and associated chemical 
inputs, but there have also been some undesirable distribution 
inequities. Furthermore, the improved varieties have been so successful 
that in many places they have displaced the traditional varieties and 
many have died out. These varieties, each with its own particular 
genetic characteristics, unless conserved, for example, in a genebank, 
are lost to the world forever. These genebanks, however, are costly to 
develop and run and, for this reason, many of the largest and most 
effective are situated in developed countries. 
Much more needs to be done. Indeed the research system that 
gave rise to the "green revolution" in the first place - the Consultative 
Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) - also places a 
high priority on the conservation of plant genetic resources. The 
CGIAR is an internationally supported network of research centres 
dedicated to contributing to sustainable improvements in the 
productivity of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries in developing 
countries. One of the CGIAR centres, the International Board for Plant 
Genetic Resources (IBPGR), has a specific mandate for plant genetic 
resource conservation. 
By the early 1980s, developing countries began to feel threatened 
by the ongoing loss of genetic diversity in agricultural crops and the 
disparity of designated storage facilities between North and South and 
the related issues of access and control; the countries where many 
crops originated felt they were losing physical control of their plant 
genetic resources. At the same time, advances in biotechnology were 
drawing attention and giving more value to genetic diversity at the gene 
level. The developing countries' concerns were intensified by the efforts 
by many industrialized countries to establish patenting systems for 
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varieties, genes, characteristics, i.e., the developed countries appeared 
to be gaining legal as well as physical control of plant genetic resources 
(Berg et al. 1991). These factors coalesced, mainly within the forum of 
the FAO, precipitating what has become a very important international 
political debate over access to and control of plant genetic resources. 
Without going into the details, one of the main outcomes has 
been the wide recognition, and the adoption by the FAO, of the 
concept of "farmers' rights." Farmers' rights recognizes that farmers 
have over the millennia been the primary developers of agricultural 
plants; it stands as an analog to "breeders' rights." Farmers have 
contributed to the genetic diversity available to plant breeders and 
biotechnologists, and this diversity is not only a product of nature as is 
suggested by patent law (Berg et al. 1991). This has become the basis 
of a political argument for a system of compensation to parallel that of 
formal intellectual property protection. 
Keystone Issues 
Since the early 1980s, the issue of 
ownership and control over the world's 
plant genetic resources has been an 
extremely contentious one. Developing 
countries in centres of diversity were and 
remain very concerned over their loss of 
legal and even physical control over 
germplasm. There was a widespread 
perception that the industrialized countries 
were employing a double standard, treating 
elite breeding lines and patented material as 
private property but insisting that the 
landraces (sometimes called "primitive 
cultivars") and the wild plant genetic 
resources of the developing world should be 
treated as the "common heritage of 
mankind." 
This issue was debated extensively in 
the forum of the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 
One of the outcomes of the debate was the 
recognition by FAO of the concept of 
"farmers' rights" as a parallel to breeders' 
rights. 
In essence, the term farmers' rights 
encompasses the view that farmers both 
past and present are plant breeders and 
that they have made valuable but 
unrewarded contributions to the 
development and maintenance of crop 
plants. The question remained of how to 
institute the reward component, of how to 
channel the "royalties." Obviously, it would 
not be possible to reward individual 
innovators or even individual nations. 
Rather, the best approach would seem to 
be to channel money into programs to 
improve the conservation and utilization of 
plant genetic resources in the centres of 
diversity. 
Such a fund was established by FAO 
in 1989; the International Fund for Plant 
Genetic Resources. It is designated for 
genetic conservation and utilization work 
and is administered by the FAO 
Commission on Plant Genetic Research. 
The fund, however, has been 
relatively inactive. It is currently a voluntary 
fund and has not received large 
contributions. In the meanwhile, the 
standoff has continued. 
In an attempt to resolve this issue, the 
Keystone International Dialogue Series on 
Plant Genetic Resources was initiated in 
1988. At the request of several companies, 
personnel in the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture and the U.S. National Academy 
of Sciences, the Keystone Center, a 
U.S.-based organization specializing in 
conflict mediation, brought together 
individuals representing the various 
viewpoints in this debate. 
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The intention was to engage these 
diverse interests in a structured, 
off-the-record, consensus-building dialogue 
with the objective of promoting a strong 
international commitment to plant genetic 
resources conservation. 
Three main ground rules were 
applied to facilitate the consensus process: 
participants attend as individuals, all 
conversations are off-the-record and not for 
attribution, and no documents are made 
public without the consensus of all 
participants. 
The first plenary session, held in 
Keystone, Colorado, resulted in a widely 
distributed consensus report covering such 
critical issues as refinements to the 
understanding of farmers' rights and 
breeders' rights, along with a number of 
recommendations to improve the global 
system of plant genetic resource 
conservation. 
A second plenary session was held in 
Madras, India, in 1990, which further 
refined the earlier recommendations and 
added specific recommendations on 
intellectual property rights, recognition of 
the role of informal innovation systems, and 
the need for funding and institutional 
mechanisms that address plant genetic 
resources as a critical aspect of overall 
concerns regarding biological diversity. 
Culture Shock 
A series of working group meetings 
were held during 1990 and early 1991 
leading up to the final plenary session. 
These included two sessions on intellectual 
property issues (one hosted by IDRC), a 
session on "sharing the benefits of plant 
genetic resources," and a session on 
institutional mechanisms. 
The final plenary session was held 
from 31 May to 4 June in Oslo, Norway. 
This session dealt extensively with the idea 
of making the fund work. Recognizing that 
the fund is designed to act as an analog to 
breeders' rights and patents with mandatory 
royalty payments, the group argued that the 
fund should be mandatory. An institutional 
structure and implementation mechanism 
was designed to implement a global plant 
genetic research initiative that will utilize, 
build upon, and improve existing 
institutional structures at all levels 
(community, national, regional, and global). 
It is hoped that the Keystone 
recommendations will be adopted by the 
international community. 
Copies of the Keystone reports are 
available from the Keystone Center, Box 
606 Keystone, Colorado, USA 80435 
Intellectual property law is a product of Western society and 
Western ideals. We have seen that within the Western cultural tradition 
there are serious concerns raised by the concept of patenting life. The 
social and ethical implications of transferring patent policies designed in 
the West to completely different cultural and social environments must 
be greater by orders of magnitude, if not completely different in kind. 
Other societies have very different concepts of life and of ownership 
that may not correspond with those inherent in patent policy. 
26 
Other societies have very 
different concepts of life 
and of ownership that 
may not correspond with 
those inherent in patent 
policy. 
These ideas simply have not been explored. In addition, it must be 
remembered that the innovation systems in many developing countries 
are quite different from those of developed countries. There is a strong 
informal system, with small-scale farmers, aboriginal herbalists, and 
others, developing an enormous range of useful innovations, many of 
them involving the use of biological materials. 
These innovations are not now protected by any intellectual 
property law, and so would be very vulnerable to being improperly 
appropriated by others in the wake of strengthened national intellectual 
property protection. The innovators themselves may not use the new 
laws to their advantage for a whole range of reasons: they may not be 
able to afford the costs of applying for (and certainly not of defending) a 
patent, they may be unaware of the market potential of their 
innovation and unwilling or unable to market it, they may be barred by 
language or geographical barriers from applying for coverage, they 
may be unaware of the implications, or they may simply not want to 
become involved in the market system. The point is that the system 
could be difficult for the informal innovators of developing countries to 
use to advantage, but there is a risk that it may be used to their 
disadvantage. 
The ethical implications of patents and patent-like protection 
applied to living organisms need to be articulated much more clearly 
and given much wider public discussion. The most important point is 
that patent laws that were not designed to deal with living organisms 
are being applied to living organisms without adequate reference to 
society. This is even more flagrant where intellectual property 
protection is "forced" on other societies. In addition to these very real 
but difficult to articulate ethical objections to patenting life per se, there 
are many "political economy" effects, with implications of consequence 
both in the developed world and in the developing countries. 
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The Research Agenda 
Hybrids act, in essence, 
as biological patents. A 
farmer growing hybrid 
varieties has to go back 
to the market each year 
for seed. 
The agenda in biological research is increasingly being dictated by 
commercial imperatives. Strengthened intellectual property protection 
is not solely responsible for this trend; it is certainly implicated as an 
important element in the privatization of research. 
Much of agricultural research and, in particular, plant breeding, 
has long been regarded as a public service. When the potential benefits 
of agricultural research were first being realized, farmers and rural 
people dependent on the prosperity of agriculture formed a large, and 
hence politically influential, block. Although this political power has 
diminished in many countries over the years, it still remains a potent 
force. It is well established that innovations in agricultural technology 
tend to benefit those first to adopt them. As more and more farmers 
follow suit, the benefits tend to decrease as increased production leads 
to a lowering of prices. 
The longer term benefits thus tend to accrue more to the 
consumers than the producers, and it has often been argued that it is 
they, through taxes, who should bear the main costs of research. Of 
course, in the final analysis, it is the consumers who pay, even under a 
system of privatized research, but through higher prices for food and 
other commodities. 
The development of hybrids in the 1930s brought the first real 
change to this. Here was a product that could be differentiated as a 
product, with a brand name and advertising. More important, the 
progeny of hybrid seed cannot economically be saved and replanted - 
subsequent generations give much lower yields. Hybrids act, in essence, 
as biological patents. A farmer growing hybrid varieties has to go back 
to the market each year for seed. Only a few species of commercial 
importance, however, are amenable to this, most notably, maize and 
some vegetable crops. The next logical step was the provision of 
intellectual property protection, then through the sequence to where 
we are today, on the brink of globally harmonized patentability of all 
things, living or not, and a very strong trend toward the privatization of 
agricultural research. 
Why, if the use of intellectual property protection will reward 
individual innovation, and the public ultimately funds agricultural 
research through pricing mechanisms, should we be concerned about 
the increasing trend toward the privatization of research? For many 
aspects of agricultural research, it might be argued that this is not 
necessarily an unhealthy trend. The concern lies, particularly, although 
not exclusively, in the increasing privatization of plant breeding. Once 
purely short-term commercial interests dominate, there is clearly a 
comparative advantage to concentrate crop improvement efforts on 
species that are of major commercial importance and that are grown 
on a large acreage, generally in the more-favoured environments. 
Minor crops that may be of vital importance to resource-poor farmers 
in diverse and often harsh environments will inevitably be neglected by 
commercial plant breeders, leading to even greater inequities between 
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farmers in favoured environments and those in the more marginal 
areas. Such a situation clearly also reinforces the trend toward a 
reduction in the number of crop species being grown in all areas, a 
trend that causes considerable concerns on environmental as well as 
long-term, food-security grounds. 
Publish or Patent 
In addition to the concerns about the focus of research, there are 
also concerns about the way research works. One of the first casualties 
of intellectual property protection is the free flow of scientific 
information. In the absence of intellectual property protection, a 
scientist's achievements are generally measured in terms of his or her 
contributions to the body of knowledge. The scale of achievement has 
been the scientist's publication record. The incentive has been to 
publish results as soon as possible (resulting in the extreme in the much 
lamented "publish or perish" scenario). This is not to suggest that 
scientists never withhold information - to do so would be romantic in 
the extreme. Numerous incentives exist, not the least being commercial 
incentives, to keep back findings until they can be exploited. However, 
the normal reward system for scientists in the absence of intellectual 
property protection demands the rapid publication of research results. 
The introduction of an intellectual property protection system 
immediately changes this incentive structure. The first rule if seeking a 
patent is to keep the research results secret. A patent cannot be 
granted if the information to be patented has already become public. 
Of course, the patent application demands disclosure. Indeed, that 
is the purpose. But, again, it is in the interests of the patent applicant 
to disclose only the minimum necessary. Other information may be 
valuable in future patents, and any extra information in the patent 
disclosure is fodder for the competition. 
Sharing the Gene Pool 
Related to this barrier to the free flow of information is the equally 
important barrier to the free flow of germplasm. Plant breeding, for 
example, requires access to the raw material, genmmplasm. Plant 
breeders' rights are designed to present as little obstruction to research 
as is possible; a protected variety can be freely employed as a parent in 
developing a new variety (although the first generation cannot be 
marketed). Patents, however, can have the effect of restricting further 
development of whatever it is that the protection applies to. If the 
patent is for a particular gene or characteristic, the patent holder may 
forbid its incorporation into a new variety. 
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Even if under a compulsory or other licensing agreement a 
researcher is allowed to use the patented gene or characteristic, there 
will be a royalty charge levied. Even if access is not denied, the cost of 
access will inevitably rise. These types of costs could develop to 
ridiculous proportions as more and more elements are patented. 
Royalty payments will not be limited to plant parts. Processes for 
transforming living organisms are also subject to patent protection in 
the U.S. Further research building on the state-of-the-art will doubtless 
become more costly to undertake. In the absence of patent protection, 
such technology is available for use and to be improved at no charge. 
In addition to this concern over the free flow of germplasm 
among breeders, there remains a concern over accessability to 
germplasm among nations. In response to the increased physical and 
legal control in the North over germplasm originating in the South, 
there have been threats of and actual restrictions on the export of 
germplasm from some countries, for example, coffee from Ethiopia 
and rubber from Brazil. Developments of this kind, although 
understandable, are in no one's interest. Plant and animal breeders will 
need as wide a gene pool as possible to draw on to adapt varieties to 
changing conditions. The detrimental effects of such restrictions may in 
fact be greatest among the countries of the South. 
Plant Breeding 
Ever since mankind learned to 
cultivate useful plants, rather than just 
gather them and their products from the 
wild, farmers have sought their 
improvement. Seeds of plants with 
particularly large yields, or that exhibited 
other useful traits, were saved for planting 
the following season. Trees with particularly 
large or tasty fruit were selected and 
propagated. In this way, over many 
millennia, a vast array of different types, 
varieties, or "landraces," were developed 
within each crop species. This process of 
crop improvement by farmers continues 
throughout the world today, especially in 
developing countries. 
The number of different types, the 
genetic variation, within each crop is 
generally largest in the region of the world 
in which the crop was first domesticated - 
its Centre of Origin; in the Fertile Crescent 
of west Asia for wheat and barley, in the 
highlands of Ethiopia for coffee (arabica), in 
South America for potatoes, and in 
southeast Asia for rice. Indeed, almost all 
crops of agricultural significance were first 
domesticated in regions of the world that 
are today classified as "developing." 
With the application of modern 
science to agriculture, the crop 
improvement efforts of farmers have 
increasingly been supplemented by those of 
scientifically trained plant breeders. In most 
of the more-developed countries, formal 
plant breeding now accounts for the 
majority of genetic advances achieved in 
crop yields and other characteristics. 
The methods employed by plant 
breeders are many and varied. They depend 
on factors such as the nature of the 
breeding system of the crop, the specific 
breeding objectives, the genetic variation 
and nature of inheritance of the 
characteristics concerned, and extent of 
resources available to the breeder. 
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All plant breeding, however, depends 
on the breeder having genes available for 
the particular traits desired. Such genes, for 
example, ones that confer early maturity or 
resistance to a disease, might be found in 
another locally bred variety of the crop, or 
in a landrace or variety originating many 
thousands of kilometres away, possibly in 
the Centre of Origin. They might even 
result from mutation induced by certain 
chemicals or by radiation. 
The breeder has first to identify plants 
with the desired characteristic and then to 
incorporate the genes for the character 
concerned into another variety or into other 
plant types with which he or she is working. 
This is often done by crossing two 
different types and selecting out of the 
progeny, in several subsequent generations, 
those types found to combine the desired 
characteristics. As the two parents 
frequently differ by a large number of 
genes, there may be an almost infinite 
number of different combinations of genes 
among their progeny. 
A large part of the plant breeder's art 
is to identify those progenies that contain 
the most useful combinations. To 
incorporate a number of different 
characters into a single variety, breeders 
frequently make repeated crosses among 
several parents, increasing further the 
variation among the progenies. Modern 
crop varieties may have tens of different 
parental lines in their ancestry, originating 
from many countries. 
Once a breeder has identified 
superior lines, they must be multiplied and 
subjected to several seasons of field testing 
under a wide range of conditions. Only 
those lines showing a definite advantage, 
whether in yield or some other character, 
compared to varieties already being grown 
are likely to be adopted by farmers. Such 
lines, once identified, must be further 
multiplied and the seed disseminated. 
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In most countries, there are national 
systems for releasing and registering new 
varieties that are designed to ensure that 
they are indeed superior to those already 
being grown. 
In a few species, most notably maize 
and some horticultural crops, systems have 
been developed for producing seed that is 
itself the direct product, (i.e., the first 
generation) of a cross between two, or a 
limited number, of parental lines. Varieties 
produced in this way are referred to as 
hybrid varieties and often have substantial 
yield advantage compared to other 
varieties. Much of this advantage is lost in 
the second and subsequent generations 
following the original cross and thus farmers 
growing hybrid varieties must buy new, 
crossed seed each season. This confers a 
natural system of protection for breeders of 
such varieties - providing they keep 
control of the parent lines they cannot be 
copied. 
Until recently, the only genes of use 
to breeders were those present within the 
concerned crop species or closely related 
ones. Now, with the development of new 
techniques for transferring genes widely 
among different species, and even between 
the animal and vegetable kingdoms, a vast, 
new array of genetic variation has been 
opened up for potential use in the 
improvement of crops, animals, and other 
life forms. Although to date genetic 
engineering has had little direct impact on 
the varieties grown by farmers, as a new 
tool for breeders, the potential is enormous. 
In spite of this, it is not a substitute for 
traditional methods. Even in this age of the 
genetic engineer, the tailoring of our crops 
to meet tomorrow's needs and conditions 
will, to a large extent, continue to depend 
on traditional breeding methods - on the 
crossing of parental lines followed by the 
selection and evaluation of superior 
progenies in a number of environments and 
over several seasons. 
Meanwhile, as the costs 
of accessing the 
necessary material and 
technologies rise, with 
royalty payments all 
around, so too will the 
cost of "intellectual 
property management." 
Meanwhile, as the costs of accessing the necessary material and 
technologies rise, with royalty payments all around, so too will the cost 
of "intellectual property management." CGIAR has recently completed 
a study on the implications of strengthened intellectual property 
protection to their system of donor-funded agricultural research (Barton 
and Siebeck 1991). The report recommends that CGIAR establish a set 
of intellectual property policies and guidelines that would lay out the 
groundrules for their relationships with research collaborators. 
Suggestions are given for individual centres regarding the acquisition of 
legal support, tracking proprietary information, patent application and 
litigation procedures, and staff policies. Indications of the costs involved 
include the cost of obtaining a typical patent, including search, filing, 
and attorneys' fees on the order of US $9,000-14,000 in the U.S.; 
the average cost of patent litigation in the U.S. is $0.5 million (each 
side) per claim. Presumably there will be a cost in staff time as well. All 
of these resources could be much better allocated to the research itself. 
Once again, the lawyers have the most to gain. 
Public Domain 
Faced with decreasing 
budgets and increasing 




As the research conducted at the International Agricultural 
Research Centres (IARCs) is intended to benefit developing countries, 
opportunities to commercialize will be limited. It is probable that most 
research can be "protected" from third-party appropriation by 
publishing it. The objective is to keep as much as possible in the public 
domain. 
IDRC itself faces similar challenges in intellectual property 
management. IDRC works with researchers in developing countries. 
Where appropriate, collaboration with Canadian researchers is 
supported. As more of the research outputs become patentable, more 
and more time and effort will be required to ensure that the legitimate 
interests of all parties are respected, while not endangering the overall 
objective of development. 
The intellectual property management decisions faced by public 
research institutions (national agriculture research services, universities) 
may not be quite so simple. Faced with decreasing budgets and 
increasing costs, there are strong pressures to commercialize research 
outputs. As David Hopper, a former Vice President of the World Bank, 
and a former President of IDRC, put it 
As the intellectual property lawyers redefine what is proper 
behaviour for research scientists, as the patents and copyrights and 
trade secrets and trademarks put more of the products of 
bioengineering into the market place as saleable technologies, the 
awkward questions from the taxpaying public will eventually force 
major changes in how agricultural research is organized, 
administered and funded. 
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In fact, the changes are already well underway. Public funding for 
plant breeding is already being reduced in some countries. The 
Cambridge Plant Breeding Institute in the U.K., a world renowned 
research organization, was sold to a subsidiary of the international 
chemical company, ICI, by the Thatcher government. Agriculture 
Canada is commercializing new varieties. The department has an 
agreement with the Treasury Board that 60% of any royalties raised 
will be reinvested in research. Theoretically, this should mean more 
money available for varietal development. The cynics might be excused 
for suggesting that new funds generated this way will be used to replace 
funds already available. 
Developing-Country Concerns 
Very little empirical or 
even theoretical work 
has been done to date 
on the effects of 




Many of the concerns over strengthened intellectual property 
protection discussed in the foregoing are magnified in the cases of 
developing countries. Public research systems are notoriously weak and 
private-sector agricultural research is virtually nonexistent in many 
countries. The ethical issues may be more pronounced, considering the 
vastly different cultures, and the costs of administration would be 
significant. 
Intellectual property law in and of itself is far from adequate to 
provide effective protection. A variety of components must be in place 
to support the law, including a legal system (with a fair and impartial 
court system), and a political and economic system that is conducive to 
private business and to the protection of private property in general 
(Lesser 1991a). 
The costs of administration and enforcement of a patent system 
are high. The U.S. spends more than US $300 million to run their 
Patent and Trademark Office (Sherwood 1990); Brazil spends US $30 
million on its National Institute of Industrial Property (Primo Braga 
1991b). Obviously, the costs are correlated with the size of the 
economy and the level of research and development activity, and 
intellectual property protection related to living organisms will be but a 
part of the system. But the returns to this kind of investment, even if at 
much lower levels, are dubious. In any event, in countries with poorly 
developed agricultural infrastructures and with low levels of social 
services generally, there is a large opportunity cost to such investment. 
Even the human resource needs to run these systems may be difficult to 
meet. 
Very little empirical or even theoretical work has been done to 
date on the effects of stronger or weaker intellectual property 
protection on developing economies (Lesser 1991a). However, a 
recent study by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DGIS 1991) 
shows that innovators from developing countries employ patents on a 
very limited basis. Investment in high technology fields is risky (for 
many other reasons than inadequate intellectual property protection), 
and established technologies can be obtained more cheaply. 
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Furthermore, strong intellectual property protection effectively 
closes off the option of low-cost imitation. The main role for a 
protection system in developing countries seems to be to encourage 
foreign investment. The DGIS review noted that in 1972 only 16% of 
patents registered in developing countries were registered to nationals. 
In 1986, developing-country nationals held slightly more than 4% of 
patent applications worldwide and, of these, 65% were from six newly 
industrialized countries (NICs). 
What are the implications for a country that chooses not to 
implement intellectual property protection for life forms? Any 
technology and any germplasm that can be obtained can be utilized 
without infringing any laws. Producers can use any materials they can 
get without paying royalties. Because there is no protection, however, 
technology holders will be reluctant to transfer the technology or the 
germplasm. This may be a significant consideration for certain 
developing countries trying to get access to new technology, although a 
more important drawback is likely to be that harvested materials grown 
from protected varieties are not exportable to countries in which they 
are protected. 
In the absence of these trade pressures, the best strategy for many 
developing countries would appear to be to not offer patent protection 
for living organisms. Instead, less strict intellectual property regimes 
that provide incentives for adaptive innovation may be much better 
suited to their needs. Plant breeders' rights might be an appropriate 
system, possibly with certain modifications to adapt the legislation to 
the specific needs and circumstances of the particular country. 
Technology access may be achieved through licensing agreements, or 
other means (none without its drawbacks). The trade pressures are a 
reality, however, and they will have to be dealt with somehow. 
Too Far Too Fast? 
Although the practice of patenting living organisms has been 
established in some countries, most notably the U.S., the 
appropriateness of this practice has not been adequately evaluated. It is 
clear that the legislation under which these patents are being granted 
was not designed for this purpose. The courts are making decisions 
largely based on whether or not the legislation expressly prohibits such 
activities. The issue is real and will be increasingly important. Clearly, 
given the implications, a full public discussion is needed, and 
appropriate legislation should be drafted based on a complete 
evaluation of all the issues involved. 
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There is little evidence 
that the majority of 
trade negotiators have 
adequately come to grips 
with the highly complex 
arguments for, and 
especially against, the 
application of patents to 
life forms. 
A major concern is raised by the evident trend toward global 
harmonization of intellectual property protection relating to living 
organisms. Encompassed as it is within trade-related negotiations, we 
are very concerned that countries may be "forced" to adopt laws that 
are not well suited to their particular conditions (including the research 
environment and the cultural heritage and value system of the nation), 
and that have not benefited from the necessary public discussion and 
evaluation. 
There are many profound concerns raised by the concept of 
patents on life forms. The concept itself, however, is so new that 
neither side in the debate has adequately marshalled its arguments. 
There is little evidence that the majority of trade negotiators have 
adequately come to grips with the highly complex arguments for, and 
especially against, the application of patents to life forms. Such 
arguments range from the religious and metaphysical, through to some 
strong concerns that patents on life will have the effect of devaluing 
society's concept of life, to consideration of the "fairness" of assigning 
commercial control of a living organism on the basis of very small 
modifications to that organism. 
We consider that the ethical implications of intellectual property 
protection applicable to living organisms to be very important, 
especially in countries with completely different cultural backgrounds. 
These issues must be aired in public dialogue in every country 
contemplating such legislation. The brevity of the treatment here 
reflects an extreme paucity of consideration in the literature, 
underlining the clear need for more research and discussion. 
Similarly, the potential implications to research in developing 
countries are very poorly understood. In many countries, indigenous 
research capacity is extremely weak. The reasons are manifold; put 
simply, these countries lack the necessary research infrastructure. The 
adoption of stronger intellectual property protection alone is unlikely to 
be adequate to stimulate much higher levels of research. On the 
contrary, there appears to be some danger that indigenous research 
capacity may actually be damaged by patents through direct 
mechanisms of control over information or germplasm, and through 
indirect mechanisms such as reduced public research expenditure and 
through the diversion of funds to the administration of the intellectual 
property protection system. Access to information may be inhibited, 
and exports may be threatened. 
Intimately connected with the whole issue of intellectual property 
protection is the larger issue of the privatization and the 
commercialization of research. There is of course a role for private 
plant breeding and private research in general. Indeed, private support 
to research has much to offer and should be encouraged. It is essential, 
however, to maintain strong public-sector involvement in biological 
research. The private sector cannot be expected to invest in research 
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the profits of which they cannot appropriate. Yet, there remain very 
important problems and situations that do not lend themselves to 
private, for-profit research and that require a strong public research 
system. Within this context, there is a real concern that publicly 
supported research should not be appropriated for the profit of a few. 
We do not reject the notion of intellectual property protection 
where it is appropriate. Patent protection of processes for the 
utilization of biological materials seem to fall within the kind of 
innovation for which patents were designed, and do not introduce the 
complications that patents on self-reproducing organisms do. They do 
raise questions of the propriety of social policy that encourages 
activities that society may not approve of. Such a lack of approval, 
however, has not been determined and, anyway, it does not seem 
possible to have a policy, such as patents, designed to stimulate only 
socially acceptable innovation. Other mechanisms are needed to 
sanction the ultimate outcomes of research. More debate is required on 
genetic engineering and what the limits should be. 
Where some form of intellectual property protection is deemed 
appropriate to stimulate investment in plant breeding and other 
biological research, plant breeders' rights offer certain benefits in terms 
of protection for the researcher with less of the attendant risk posed by 
strong patent coverage. We recommend that this form of protection be 
given careful consideration in lieu of patent protection for plant 
varieties. Plant breeders' rights must be modified to meet the specific 
needs of the country enacting the legislation. Similar approaches to 
legislation may be useful for animals and other life forms, offering 
incentives to research without the potential dangers and ethical 
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